




### OUR AIM • Examine some historic trading losses and the biggest bank failures. • Identify what regulators are supposed to do. • What are banks? How can we define them? • Who are the Regulators? • Can Regulators stop a Boris Yeltsin (LTCM Collapse)? • Review Jamaica's late 1990's meltdown and Ponzi schemes in Jamaica and Antigua. • In the information and social media age – new and better use of regulatory tools.














Ř	Managing risk for profit is fine;
	threatening whole populations of many countries at one go with
Ų.	unbridled and under-regulated
	riskis <u>extreme irresponsibility</u> .
	Components









## What are Regulators supposed to do? 1. PRUDENTIAL: To protect Depositors by reducing the level of risk to which bank creditors are exposed. 2. SYSTEMIC RISK REDUCTION: Take measures to avoid (reduce) the disruption risk associated with difficult or adverse market trading conditions for banks which could cause multiple bank failures. 3. AVOID CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN BANKS: The BCCI/Franklin Square National Bank phenomenon Reduce the risk of banks being used for criminal purposes such as money laundering and funding criminals and their illegal activities. 4. PROTECT BANK CONFIDENTIALITY 5. CREDIT ALLOCATION: to direct credit to favoured sectors.

AND
What are Regulators supposed to do?
Protect taxpayers from "private sector" bankers loading them with very public and pervasive
"moral hazard" – unsuspecting taxpayer
becoming bankers, insurers and funding
suppliers of last resort
TAXPANT
ORDINAL NO.
Componite

What are Banks? How do we define the	hem?
Banks are unique deposit-taking businesse extraordinary state-supplied licences to money, and even create or participate with th	make
in <u>creating and disbursing money</u> , with <u>les</u>	
(unelected) to <u>taxpavers</u> who are <u>banks'</u> ef <u>lenders and insurers</u> of last resort. <i>No</i>	fective
company in most any other sector has this licence to wealth.	aind of
3 -	
	Corporate




And if you are lucky to be part of a union of states like the <u>USA</u> or the <u>Eurozone</u>, you may even be able to get some poor sucker of a taxpayer from a more prudently fiscally managed region, say, Wisconsin or Maine in the USA, or Germany in the EU to pay for bad bank management decisions and losses in New York State or the "Euro-states of Greece and Spain", respectively.


### Who are these Regulators? 1. Bank Directors and senior executives (The fish stinks from the head). 2. Shareholders 3. Central Banks and similar regulatory bodies funded by the public purse 4. Accountants 5. Credit Rating Agencies 6. Technical Financial Parliamentary Oversight Committees 7. Taxpayers and the general public

### Have Regulators done enough? The answer would have to be "no" – even if the question was framed rather narrowly to address only regulatory changes.











## ACCOUNTANTS How do accountants leave as unqualified financial statements of banks which gave "secured loans" (subprime) when in many cases the real state of the "security" was equal to, or less than, the value of the loan?















## TAXPAYERS The final and weakest player as the Regulator. This group, which is left carrying the proverbial bag from the banks and sovereign bailouts must be, and should be, very aggrieved. Using the Ballot Box.


### OTHERS WITH RESPONSIBILITY

Aggressive, underinformed, uninformed, risk-happy, and greedy borrowers (individuals engaged in sub-prime borrowing, ponzi schemes, countries like Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain – and Jamaica!)

### CAN REGULATORS STOP A "BORIS YELTSIN"?

- Monday, August 17, 1998
   Yeltsin's Russia defaulted on Russian debt;
- Yeltsin devalued the Russian Ruble massively;
- After a lull and bravado statements by big banks – the financial markets went into panic;









### SHOULD REGULATORS HAVE BEEN QUICKER TO LIMIT LTCM'S TRADING AND EXPOSURE TO BANKS? • LTCM was low-keyed but highly leveraged (all its money was borrowed) and traded in equity spreads derivatives; • Derivatives were largely unknown but leverage was not; • Leverage and Foreign Exchange Trading were always the "Achilles heel" of banks – derivatives were

moving rapidly up the ladder of risk.

## JAMAICAN MELTDOWN AND PONZI SCHEMES • The booming world economy allowed Government to feed its insatiable appetite for debt. • Just load the ever more expensive debt on to future generation. • GOJ's high interest rates on its paper discouraged productive investment (classical economics at play!) in the real economy.

# JAMAICAN MELTDOWN AND PONZI SCHEMES Many banks got into trouble through bad real estate and esoteric loans. Politics – "black man time now" drove many economic decisions. The Ponzi Scheme found a fertile economic environment, which was hooked on high returns. The middle class swallowed copiously and suffered sustained and severe pain when the bubble burst.

JAMAICAN MELT AND PONZI SCH	
<ul> <li>To be fair on the Ponzi schemes, the Financial Services         Commission sounded the alarm – but the voice of greed drowned those warnings.     </li> <li>Not one Ponzi operator has been convicted in Jamaica!</li> </ul>	Allen Stanford  Comparable Stanford

### Regulators, please use:

- More and regular reporting by banks (and other Financial institutions) directly to the public.
- Bank's spreads report, monthly to the public, average interest costs on categories of deposits + aggregate number and, average interest costs on loans
- Report monthly and to the public, major non-loan assets with detailed explanations of equity backing for this asset class – or leverage booked for backing.

### Regulators, please use:

- Force bank boards to make bad management decision-makers to be more accountable. Tie tenure to performance "good" clearly defined in terms of leverage, unbacked-by-equity off-balance sheet, leveraged transactions (derivatives, etc) and not just short term profits.
- Governments need to publish their accounts according to international accounting standards.
   Often, one is charitable when what is published now is labelled "misleading".

In the broad scheme of things, the world is getting riskier and banks may be forced to take more and bigger risks.

• "Too big to fail" is a growing concern, but an interconnected world with huge trade and financial flows needs big banks – with large shareholders' equity.

